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The past two decades, following the end of the Cold War and the events of 9/11,
witnessed a growing interest in religion among American scholars and policy
analysis that touches upon the broad field of international affairs.¹ This interest
is not only confined to the field of international affairs, but is a much wider phe-
nomenon that cuts across disparate fields and disciplines – from philosophy, to
the humanities, the natural sciences, and medicine – so much so, that John
Schmalzbauer and Kathleen Mahoney, have talked about an increasingly
“post-secular academy.”² This post-secular turn in the academy, Schmalzbauer
and Mahoney argue, has been spearheaded by a “religious resurgence move-
ment,” a heterogeneous and often uncoordinated group of scholars, who have
both directly and indirectly “raised the profile of religion in American higher ed-
ucation.”³
A similar movement has taken place in the field of international affairs, with
the rise of what I call American post-secular expertise on international affairs.
The concept of post-secular here does not define who these experts are – wheth-
er they are religious or not, or whether they used to be secular in the private and
public sphere and now religious – but what they do. That is, these experts are
post-secular because they are closely tied to the production of a particular
knowledge regime that seeks to challenge the dominant secular paradigms
that underpin the social sciences as well as international affairs scholarship.
This article argues that much American scholarship challenging the secular
premises of social scientific research on international affairs cannot be com-
pletely divorced from parallel efforts directed towards challenging the secular
premises of American foreign policy. In other words, American scholarship seek-
ing to bring a better understanding of religion into the social scientific study of
international affairs is in many cases either explicitly or implicitly contributing –
 I use the term “international affairs” to include a broad range of fields and disciplines, such
as international relations, comparative politics, peace and security studies, area studies, inter-
national law, and/or international and comparative sociology.
 John Schmalzbauer and Kathleen Mahoney, “Religion and Knowledge in the Post-Secular
Academy” (New York: SSRC Working Papers, ). See also John Schmalzbauer and Kathleen
A. Mahoney, “American Scholars Return to Studying Religion,” Contexts . ().
 Schmalzbauer and Mahoney, “Religion and Knowledge in the Post-Secular Academy,” .
to paraphrase Schmalzbauer and Mahoney – to raising the profile of religion in
American foreign policy.
We can think of post-secular expertise and experts as constituting a partic-
ular kind of epistemic community. An epistemic community is “a network of pro-
fessionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and
an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue
area.”⁴ Post-secular experts base much of their authority on their social scientific
knowledge of religion(s), as well as – in many cases – on their firsthand religious
belief, belonging, and experience.⁵ These experts are challenging social scien-
tists and policymakers alike to recognize and acknowledge the importance of re-
ligion as a social phenomenon, and, when speaking also from a religious per-
spective, as a way of knowing.⁶ Thinking of American post-secular experts not
simply as detached scholars, but also as taking part in a epistemic community
– a heterogeneous and pluralist one with its internal debates, disagreements
and often competing agendas – conceptually highlights their relationship and
relevance to policy debates and policy-making.⁷
The post-secular epistemic community on international affairs is influential
in American foreign policy debates and practices in three ways. First, it has been
effective in discursively arguing that religion matters in world politics. In partic-
ular, it has highlighted the limits of standard secularization theories and secular
knowledge paradigms, showing that religions are not only still alive and well in
the modern world, but also that their social and political salience is globally re-
surging.
Second, this epistemic community has been important in arguing not only
that religion matters, but also in showing how it matters. In particular, it has
challenged the premises of much social scientific research that understands re-
ligion exclusively as epiphenomenal and reducible to other factors – whether
economic, political, or individual. It has put forward the case for treating reli-
gion, instead, as “an independent variable” or as an “autonomous force.” A
 Peter M. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,”
International Organization . (): .
 I will use interchangeably the terms expertise, experts, and epistemic community. For a dis-
cussion about religious actors and organizations, not including scholars, as an “epistemic com-
munity,” see Nukhet A. Sandal, “Religious Actors as Epistemic Communities in Conflict Trans-
formation: The Cases of South Africa and Northern Ireland,” Review of International Studies .
().
 Some, for instance, have a triple orientation – as committed religious individuals, as scholarly
analysts of religion, and as policy-engaged actors on matters of religion.
 Gil Eyal and Larissa Buchholz, “From the Sociology of Intellectuals to the Sociology of Inter-
ventions,” Annual Review of Sociology  (): .
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growing number of international events, especially when it comes to conflict and
violence or peace and democracy, cannot be understood if one does not take re-
ligion – whether actors, communities, beliefs, or identities – seriously into ac-
count, these authors claim.
Third, drawing from the above arguments, post-secular experts have often
concluded that American foreign policy cannot afford to ignore a world that is
experiencing a revival in the social and political salience of religions. The
point is made that, if America is to create a more peaceful and secure interna-
tional order, its diplomats and security officials need to shed much of their sec-
ular biases and do a better job in understanding religion and including religious
actors and resources in foreign policy. Hence, we often find that scholars and
centers engaged in the social scientific study of religion and its effects on inter-
national societies and politics are also engaged in debates on two key issues
which pertain to American foreign policy: religious engagement and faith-
based approaches to conflict-resolution, and the promotion of international reli-
gious freedom.
An investigation into the connections between post-secular expertise and
American foreign policy is warranted for a number of reasons. First, because
there has been little research carried out so far on this relationship and what
it means for the pursuit of social scientific knowledge about religion beyond
the United States. The intent here is not to get involved in normative and policy
debates about the necessity, or perils, of bringing religion into American foreign
policy. Nor do I want to make any specific claims about the need for or impos-
sibility of having a more clear distinction between objective, value-neutral social
scientific research on religion, and subjective normative religious preferences
and ethics. Furthermore, it is not my intention to engage in contentious debates
about First Amendment interpretations regarding the establishment clause and
the free exercise of religion when it comes to American foreign policy.
The point is, however, to generate a more self-reflective debate within the so-
cial scientific study of religion about the American-centric nature of much of this
literature – not only in terms of its origins in the American academy, but also
because of its substantial proximity to America’s national interest and foreign
policy concerns. Put differently, the scope here is not to engage in policy debates,
or to critique or praise post-secular expertise, nor to police the boundaries of
what appropriate scholarship on religion should be. The intent here is largely
of a sociological and analytical nature: to highlight and make more explicit,
as others have done in other domains,⁸ a phenomenon that has generally
 For example, the heavy American footprint in terms of scholars, institutions, funding, and
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been underappreciated and overlooked when it comes to scholarship on religion
in international affairs.
Second, this investigation is warranted because scholarly research on the in-
fluence of religion in American foreign policy, so far, has generally ignored the
place and role of elites and post-secular expertise. In fact, while interest in reli-
gion and American foreign policy has grown exponentially over the past decade,
most of the literature has focused on the role of religious organizations and
movements,⁹ or on the personal religiosity of American people¹⁰ and their pres-
idents,¹¹ or on the religious – protestant and missionary – character of American
exceptionalism and national identity.¹² Yet, that experts and epistemic commun-
ities can and do have an influence on foreign policy has been shown by an in-
creasing number of studies,¹³ none of which, however, has paid enough atten-
tion to post-secular expertise.
To be specific, this chapter does not offer any strictly causal or explanatory
analysis. I will not trace the process nor identify the precise mechanisms through
which the American post-secular epistemic community on international affairs
has affected American foreign policy. Its scope is more modest. On the one
hand, it maps the emergence of post-secular expertise on international affairs.
It traces two novel phenomena. First, the development of new policy-oriented
centers and initiatives in key universities, think tanks, and research institutes
dedicated to the study of religion. Second, it traces the development of important
what type of research is being produced, and for what purposes, in international relations (IR) –
the discipline I identify with – has long been recognized in the field itself. See Stanley Hoff-
mann, “An American Social Science: International Relations,” Daedalus . (); Ole Wa-
ever, “The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American and European Developments
in International Relations,” International Organization .  ().
 See, among many, Stephen R. Rock, Faith and Foreign Policy: The Views and Influence of U.S.
Christians and Christian Organizations (New York, NY: Continuum International, ).
 See, among many, James L. Guth, “Religion and American Public Opinion: Foreign Policy
Issues,” The Oxford Handbook of Religion and American Politics, ed. James L. Guth, Lyman A.
Kellstedt, and Corwin E. Smidt (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, );Walter Russell
Mead, “God’s Country,” Foreign Affairs . ().
 See, among many, Andrew Bacevich and Elizabeth Prodromou, “God Is Not Neutral: Reli-
gion and US Foreign Policy after /,” Orbis . ().
 Dennis R. Hoover, ed. Religion and American Exceptionalism (New York, NY: Routledge,
).
 Emanuel Adler and Peter M. Haas, “Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and
the Creation of a Reflective Research Program,” International Organization . (); Jeffrey
T. Checkel, “Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution,” World Politics
. (); Jolyon Howorth, “Discourse, Ideas, and Epistemic Communities in European Secur-
ity and Defence Policy,” West European Politics .  ().
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faith-based think and do tanks, which have contributed substantially to the rise
of religion in scholarly and policy debates. On the other hand, this mapping is
used to highlight the connections between academic and official narratives,
and the institutional links between key individuals and centers constitutive of
the post-secular epistemic community, and the religious engagement and inter-
national religious freedom foreign policy agendas.
Third, and lastly, the neglect of research on post-secular expertise appears
also rooted in a general portrayal of American elites as singularly secular, wheth-
er individually secularized (with little believing in or belonging to any religion),
epistemically secular (with no interest in the study of religion), or ideologically
secularist (with anti-religious sentiments). Such an understanding of the secular
nature of American intellectual life is put forward, among many, by important
American sociologists of religion, such as Peter Berger and Christian Smith.¹⁴
This chapter contributes to challenging this dominant narrative of intellectual
and scholarly elites, in general, and American ones, in particular, as overwhelm-
ingly secular, secularized, and secularist.
The essay is organized around two main sections that follow each other in
chronological order. The first section charts the early emergence of the post-sec-
ular epistemic community from the end of the Cold War up to around the year
2000. The second section traces the expansion of post-secular expertise in the
American academy and among policy-oriented research institutions following
the events of 9/11. These two sections highlight how post-secular expertise con-
solidated around a number of key themes as they became ever more important in
the making and delivery of American foreign policy from the 1990 s onwards,
namely: producing better knowledge and understanding of religion, engaging re-
ligious communities abroad to resolve conflicts, promoting international reli-
gious freedom norms and arrangements.
1 1989–2000: The Emergence of Post-secular
Expertise
With the end of the Cold War, debates in Washington DC about the Soviet threat,
containment, balance of power, and mutually assured destruction increasingly
 Peter L. Berger, ed. The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics
(Grand Rapids, MI: Ethics and Public Policy Center; Eermans Publishing, ); Christian
Smith, The Secular Revolution: Power, Interests, and Conflict in the Secularization of American
Public Life (London: University of California Press, ).
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petered out. The American foreign policy establishment was left in search of new
paradigms and perspectives that would help interpret and explain the emerging
post-Cold War world. One was Francis Fukuyama’s optimistic account of the
“end of history” and the emergence of a peaceful and prosperous era driven
by the triumph of economic and political liberalism. Another was Samuel Hun-
tington’s famous “Clash of Civilizations” thesis, which from the influential pages
of Foreign Affairs – the leading journal among American foreign policy elites
published by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), America’s preeminent
think tank on international politics – offered a rather different vision of world
politics to come.
Huntington’s reference to civilizations, which he largely defined around reli-
gious identity and history, did more than just offer an alternative narrative to lib-
eral cosmopolitan optimism. At a time when many states appeared mired in do-
mestic conflicts along ethnic-religious lines and Islamist movements were
spreading across and beyond the Middle East, it abruptly brought, at the center
of both scholarly and foreign policy, attention to a number of distinct but often
intimately related discussions about the role and place of religion in internation-
al affairs.
1.1 Religion matters
Huntington indirectly brought attention to the vastly unexplored and seemingly
growing relevance of cultural and religious forces in international politics. In-
deed, not incidentally, the 1990 s saw the publication of a number of sociological
works that directly challenged the secularization thesis and highlighted the con-
tinued, if not expanding, public vibrancy of religions and religious movements
in America and around the world. The first volumes of the monumental Funda-
mentalism Project, edited by Martin Marty and Scott Appleby, were making their
appearance in the scholarly world at this time.¹⁵ Sociologists of religion such as
José Casanova were deeply challenging the privatization thesis embedded in sec-
ularization theories.¹⁶
What quite vigorously caught the attention of scholars and policy research-
ers at the time, in particular, was Peter Berger’s recanting of the secularization
 Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, The Fundamentalism Project,  vols. (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, ).
 José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press, ).
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thesis that he had done much to advance in the 1960 s-70 s.¹⁷ In 1999, Peter Berg-
er published an edited book suggestively titled The Desecularization of the World:
Resurgent Religion and World Politics,¹⁸ under the auspices of the Ethics and Pub-
lic Policy Center (EPPC), a Washington-based think tank with a conservative and
religious bent.¹⁹ In the volume, Berger famously argued:
[…] the assumption that we live in a secularized world is false. The world today, with some
exceptions […] is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so than ever.
This means that a whole body of literature by historians and social scientists loosely la-
beled “secularization theory” is essentially mistaken.²⁰
1.2 Religion, conflict and peace
Huntington’s piece also tapped into conventional understandings of the power of
religions, in his case religion as an exclusive identity marker, in structuring and
causing political conflict. Unlike much literature at the time that tended to see
cultural forces as epiphenomenal, Huntington brought religion center stage in
inter-state and inter-human relations. The concern for religion as a force for vio-
lence was mirrored by other research highlighting instead its possible contribu-
tions to peace.
Around the time of Huntington’s Foreign Affairs article, Douglas Johnston
was working on the Religion and Conflict Resolution Project at the Center for
Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), a Washington-based think tank. The
project, which Johnston has described as “a complete novelty for a think tank
devoted to hardnosed strategic issues and known for its realist Cold War mental-
ity,”²¹ culminated in the 1994 co-edited volume with Cynthia Sampson, Religion:
the Missing Dimension of Statecraft. The volume, forwarded by the former presi-
dent Jimmy Carter and produced under the auspices of a major security-based
 Peter L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (New York,
NY: Anchor Books, ).
 Berger, The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics. (Grand Rap-
ids, MI: Ethics and Public Policy Center, Eermans Publishing, ).
 The EPPC was established in  to “clarify and reinforce the bond between the Judeo-
Christian moral tradition and the public debate over domestic and foreign policy issues.” It is
a think tank that brings together conservative Catholic, Evangelical, and Jewish intellectuals
and analysts and straddles between secular and religious research. See http://www.eppc.org/
about/
 Berger, The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics, .
 Douglas M. Johnston,  June, , interview with the author.
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think tank, was one of the first and most prominent pieces of research intended
to speak to a broader policy audience about the nexus between religion, vio-
lence, and peace-building.
Johnston and Sampson’s intent was to push for an intellectual paradigm
shift by exposing both the epistemic and ideological secularist bias of the foreign
policy and diplomatic establishment. Articles throughout the volume com-
plained that in a world increasingly abuzz with religious fervor, the intellectual
traditions and statecraft practices that American diplomats and policy-makers
were steeped in were stubbornly secularist. American statecraft suffered from
an “enlightenment prejudice,” some suggested,²² or “dogmatic secularism,” oth-
ers lamented.²³ This secularist bias, the book argued, was problematic for two
reasons. First, it led scholars, policymakers and diplomats to discount the grow-
ing salience of religion in international affairs. Secondly, if religion was to be
brought back into the study and praxis of international diplomacy, it should
not be seen solely as a cause of conflicts, but also as a way to foster nonviolent
change, and preventing or resolving conflicts.
Upon leaving CSIS, Johnston founded the International Center for Religion
and Diplomacy (ICRD) in 1999. This was an important turning point for the deep-
ly secularized foreign policy institutional and intellectual landscape in Washing-
ton. The ICRD was the first and most prominent faith-based “think and do tank”
entirely dedicated to conducting programs and research at the nexus between re-
ligion and conflict around the world. ICRD was mainly created to practice what
Johnston had preached in his edited volume The Missing Dimension. That is,
“prevent and resolve identity-based conflicts that exceed the reach of traditional
diplomacy by incorporating religion as part of the solution.”²⁴ Since 1999, John-
ston and ICRD have been at the forefront of debates about the necessity of inte-
grating faith-based approaches to conflict resolution in American statecraft and
diplomatic practices.
A further seminal work on religion, conflict, and peace published in this dec-
ade was Scott Appleby’s The Ambivalence of the Sacred.²⁵ The book was an out-
 Edward Luttwak, “The Missing Dimension,” Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft,
eds. Douglas M. Johnston and Cynthia Sampson (New York, NY: Oxford University Press,
), .
 Stanton Burnett, “Implications for the Foreign Policy Community “ Religion, the Missing Di-
mension of Statecraft, ed. Douglas M. Johnston and Cynthia Sampson (New York, NY: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, ), .
 http://icrd.org/.
 R. Scott Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation (Lan-
ham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, ).
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growth of a project at the Kroc Institute for International Peace of the University
of Notre Dame, funded in part by The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Dead-
ly Conflict, concerned with bringing greater attention to religion and human
rights and to emerging theories of religious peace building. The Kroc Institute
was founded in 1986 out of a deep concern for nuclear weapons and the arms
race. Here, in 2000, thanks to Scott Appleby, a Program on Religion, Conflict
and Peacebuilding was then launched.
1.3 International religious freedom
Echoing Huntington’s theme of civilizational clashes, Michael Horowitz, a senior
fellow at the Hudson Institute, a conservative think tank in Washington DC, pub-
lished in 1995 an editorial in The Wall Street Journal entitled, “New Intolerance
Between the Crescent and the Cross.” The inflammatory article was responsible
for putting the issue of alleged mounting Christian persecution in Muslim-major-
ity countries on the map. As the campaign against Christian persecution gath-
ered momentum, vigorously pushed forward also by Nina Shea and Paul Mar-
shall of the Center for Religious Freedom at Freedom House, a Washington-
based research and advocacy institute, it produced the Congressional initiatives
which ultimately led to the passage of the International Religious Freedom Act
(IRAF) in 1998.²⁶
IRFA led to the institutionalization of religious freedom as an instrument of
American foreign policy. This policy change increased the profile and importance
of international religious persecution and freedom among American foreign af-
fairs experts. When Robert Seiple, first-ever U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for Inter-
national Religious Freedom in the State Department (between 1998–2000),
left his post, he founded another key institution in the faith-based “think and
do tank” DC panorama, the Institute for Global Engagement (IGE).
Since 2000, IGE, which has been directed by Robert’s son Chris Seiple, has
pursued two important and parallel missions. First, it has directly worked for the
promotion of international religious freedom through programs and initiatives
on the ground. Second, it has sought to become a leading intellectual force at
the intersection of American scholarly and policy debates on religion and reli-
 For different perspectives on the motivations animating the anti-persecution and religious
freedom campaign, see Allen D. Hertzke, Freeing God’s Children: the Unlikely Alliance for Global
Human Rights (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, ); T. Jeremy Gunn, “The United
States and the Promotion of Freedom of Religion and Belief,” in Facilitating Freedom of Religious
Belief: A Deskbook, ed. Tore Lindholm, et al. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, ).
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gious freedom in international affairs. IGE’s contribution to these debates and to
American foreign policy will be touched upon in greater detail in the following
section.
In sum, with the end of the Cold War, religion appeared to command a
sporadic but growing attention among leading scholars in the social sciences
and among certain areas of the Washington–based think tank and policy advo-
cacy community. Huntington’s Foreign Affairs article brought public attention to
a range of issues as they pertained to the intersection of religion and internation-
al affairs. ²⁷ Security-based think tanks such as the CSIS, more generalist ones
such as the Hudson Institute and Freedom House, faith-based ones such as
the long-established EPPC and the newly created ICRD and IGE, along with
Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute, were all giving greater attention to the matter.
These developments anticipated many of the issues and themes – from an inter-
est in understanding global religious dynamics, to faith-based approaches to
conflict-resolution, and international religious freedom – that would then be
picked up, expanded and carried forward by an increasing number of scholarly
and policy research projects and initiatives in the post-9/11 world.
2 2001–2014: The Expansion and Consolidation
of Post-secular Expertise
The public religiosity of President Bush, the attacks on September 11, 2001 car-
ried out by Al Qaeda, an organization that based its political legitimacy and
worldview on a radical interpretation of Islam, and the religiously charged dis-
courses that surrounded America’s War on Terror thereafter, have had a dramatic
effect in spurring greater attention to religion in American scholarly circles and
foreign policy debates. Post-secular expertise expanded considerably, progres-
sively consolidating in both secular and religious-based universities, secular
and newly created faith-based think tanks, and other research centers. This de-
velopment occurred along the intellectual tracks already laid out in the previous
decade.
 A fourth area where Huntington’s article was seminal was in directing foreign policy atten-
tion towards Islam. This spurred important debates about the possibilities of clashes or dialogue
with the Muslim world in the post-Cold War era. For reasons of space, this article focuses mostly
on the issue of religion more generally and not Islam in particular. For a more detailed account
of American post-secular expertise on Islam and foreign policy change, see Gregorio Bettiza,
“The Social and Material Construction of Civilizations in International Relations: the ‘Muslim
World’in American Foreign Policy after / “ (Florence: Max Weber Working Paper, ).
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2.1 Religion matters
Universities, often thought of as the bedrock institutions of secularism in Amer-
ica, started to open centers and offer new courses, discussing the complex and
apparently ever growing salience of religion in international politics. This section
does not present a comprehensive list of all new courses and developments
across the American academy.²⁸ It will focus on a number of changes in leading
scholarly institutions, especially those with important links to the Washington
foreign policy community.
A key development in post-secular expertise in the academic panorama has
been the inauguration in 2006 of the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and
World Affairs, at Georgetown University in Washington DC.²⁹ Georgetown has
long been recognized as a leading training ground for America’s security experts,
diplomats, and foreign policy decision-makers. The Berkley Center has been or-
ganized around an ever-expanding number of programs that carry out research,
organize conferences, and design university courses on religion in international
affairs. As of 2014, the center featured such programs as Globalization, Religions,
and the Secular, led by José Casanova; Religion and US Foreign Policy, led by
Thomas Farr; the Religious Freedom Project, led by Thomas Farr and Timothy
Samuel Shah; Religion, Conflict, and Peace led, by Eric Patterson; and Islam
and World Politics, led by Jocelyne Cesari.
I will touch upon some of these programs in greater detail in a moment.
What is interesting to note, at this stage, is that much of this wealth of knowl-
edge produced by prominent scholars in the fields of sociology of religion, reli-
gion in comparative and international politics, and Islam in world politics, filters
into policy-making through two important channels. First, through teaching and
in particular thanks to an optional certificate course in Religion, Ethics, and
World Affairs, available to interested students, launched by the Berkley Center
in 2011 in collaboration with Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School
of Foreign Service. Second, through a wide-ranging series of scholarly publica-
tions, courses, events, and seminars explicitly targeted not just to scholars but
also to foreign policy and security officials in the State Department and the mili-
tary.³⁰
The Notre Dame Kroc Institute’s Religion, Conflict and Peacebuilding pro-
gram, under the direction of Scott Appleby, has continued to be a key center
 For a good overview of courses in the United States see: http://globalengage.org/global-ed
ucation/syllabi. Accessed October , .
 berkleycenter.georgetown.edu .
 http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/publications and berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/events
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in the production of social scientific, as well as theological,³¹ knowledge on re-
ligion and peace. Daniel Philpott, one of the leading and most prominent voices
in the burgeoning field of religion in comparative politics and international rela-
tions, has long been associated with the Kroc Institute.
Other major universities, with a more secular tradition than Catholic George-
town and Notre Dame, have launched important projects. The Belfer Center, Har-
vard University’s Center for international affairs, hosted between 2007–2012 the
Initiative on Religion in International Affairs directed by Monica Duffy Toft, one
of the foremost scholars of religion and conflict. Courses, seminars, executive
training sessions, and research projects were offered, “focusing on the study
of religion as it bears on international relations and foreign policy,”³² with the
goal to “integrate a sophisticated understanding of religion with international af-
fairs in policymaking and scholarship.”³³
Johns Hopkins’ School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS), in the
heart of Washington DC, labeled its 2009– 10 academic year the Year of Religion,
and hosted a wide range of seminars, workshops and events on the topic.³⁴ A
Global Politics and Religion Initiative was then launched in 2012 designed to
help incorporate the study of religion and politics into the school’s existing grad-
uate-level international relations program; to promote new Master’s degree
courses, faculty and community research seminars; and to provide executive ed-
ucation training sessions. The initiative’s goal is to “foster an appreciation and
deeper understanding of religion and international affairs among students,
scholars and practitioners who will shape and influence future policymaking.”³⁵
In terms of the academic environment, a further noteworthy development
was the inauguration in 2007 of The Immanent Frame blog, sponsored by the So-
cial Science and Research Council. The blog has been at the forefront of scholarly
debates on religion and the secular in the humanities and the social sciences,
hosting contributions by prominent social theorists and philosophers in the
field.³⁶ The blog has also served as an important venue for a number of debates
 http://kroc.nd.edu/research/religion-conflict-peacebuilding/theology-practice-just-peace
 http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/project//religion_in_international_affairs.html?page_
id=
 http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/project//religion_in_international_affairs.html?page_
id=
 www.sais-jhu.edu/religion/index.htm
 www.sais-jhu.edu/academics/functional-studies/global-theory-history/global-politics-and-
religion-initiative.html
 The blog, edited by Jonathan VanAntwerpen, has published contributions by Charles Tay-
lor, Jürgen Habermas, Talal Asad, Robert Bellah, Craig Calhoun, José Casanova,William E. Con-
nolly, Mark Juergensmeyer, and Saba Mahmood, among others.
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about the growing operationalization of religion in American foreign policy,
whether religious engagement and faith-based approaches to conflict resolution,
or religious freedom.³⁷ While some, such as Elizabeth Shakman Hurd or Win-
nifred Fallers Sullivan, have tended to be critical, these developments have nev-
ertheless contributed to substantially raise the stakes as well as attention around
the growing nexus between religion and US foreign policy, far beyond the imme-
diate circle of its most engaged advocates.
Interest in understanding religion, how it relates to international affairs and
American foreign policy, has not been the concern of academics and universities
alone. Policy-makers and think tanks are also increasingly turning their gaze to-
wards God. That the intellectual mood among policy elites was increasingly
changing became especially evident when the former-Secretary of State Made-
leine Albright published her autobiographical reflections on how the “Mighty
and the Almighty” had become surprisingly relevant to international relations
and America’s security at the dawn of the twenty-first century.³⁸ In her memoirs,
Mrs. Albright argued that in order “to anticipate events rather than merely re-
spond to them, American diplomats will need to […] think more expansively
about the role of religion in foreign policy and about their own need for exper-
tise.”³⁹
The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) has wholly embraced and partly led
this post-secular turn within the policy community. From 2003 to 2006, CFR
launched a Religion and U.S. Foreign Policy Project – designed to address
“one of the most important challenges facing U.S. foreign policy in the 21st cen-
tury: the growing importance of religion in world politics”⁴⁰ – led by Walter Rus-
sell Mead, a historian and scholar of American foreign policy, and Timothy Sa-
muel Shah, a political scientist. During this period, CFR became active in
engaging the evangelical community and its leaders, such as Richard Land of
the Southern Baptist Convention, and Rick Warren pastor of Saddleback
Church.⁴¹ Mead’s seminal article “God’s Country?,” which appeared in 2006
 http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif////engaging-religion-at-the-department-of-state/ and
http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/the-politics-of-religious-freedom/
 Madeleine K. Albright, The Mighty and the Almighty: Reflections on America, God, and World
Affairs, Large print ed. (New York, NY: Harper Large Print, ).
 Madeleine K. Albright, The Mighty and the Almighty: Reflections on America, God, and World
Affairs, .
 http://www.cfr.org/projects/religion-and-politics/religion-and-us-foreign-policy-project/
pr
 http://www.cfr.org/projects/world/evangelicals-and-foreign-policy-roundtable/pr;
http://www.cfr.org/religion-and-politics/christian-evangelicals-us-foreign-policy/p
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on the pages of Foreign Affairs and charted the growth and influence of Evangel-
icals in American foreign policy, grew out of these initiatives.
Following this early and specific interest on Evangelicals, CFR then estab-
lished in 2006 a broader Religion and Foreign Policy Initiative. Its stated
scope is to provide a more structured “forum to deepen the understanding of is-
sues at the nexus of religion and U.S. foreign policy.” The initiative does so by
collecting research, hosting conferences, and organizing events as a way to con-
nect and serve as a resource for religious and congregational leaders, scholars,
and thinkers on religion “whose voices are increasingly important to the national
foreign policy debate.”⁴² A Religious Advisory Committee provides guidance for
all aspects of the initiative. Along with boasting the presence of Madeleine Al-
bright, it includes many of the most prominent American scholars and analysts
on religion, as well as religious leaders across groups and denominations.⁴³
A number of leading Washington-based think tanks covering both domestic
and foreign affairs are also paying increasing attention to religion. Since the
early 2000 s, the Brookings Institute moved slowly beyond exploring the inter-
section of religion in domestic politics, widening its interest toward international
affairs. In 2003, it organized a prominent conference on religion and American
foreign policy, which led to an edited volume Liberty and Power: A Dialogue
on Religion and U.S. Foreign Policy in an Unjust World. Through the work of schol-
ars and fellows – such as E.J. Dionne on religion in America, Justin Vaisse on
Islam and Europe, and Ömer Taşpinar on religion and secularism in Turkey
and the Middle East – Brooking’s engagement with religious actors and issues
has expanded considerably over the past decade.
The AEI has hosted discussions and commentary by Michael Novak and oth-
ers on religion and American politics since the 1980 s. Their frequency, however,
noticeably increased during the 1990 s, as a quick glance at AEI’s webpages re-
veals.⁴⁴ Following 2001, a growing attention was directed towards international
 http://www.cfr.org/about/outreach/religioninitiative/mission.html
 Among scholars and analysts, the committee includes Peter Berger, Boston University; Fa-
ther Bryan Hehir, Harvard University; Scott Appleby, University of Notre Dame; Reza Aslan, Uni-
versity of California Riverside; Mark Noll, University of Notre Dame; Luis Lugo, Pew Forum on
Religion and Public Life; and Paul Marshall, Hudson Institute. It counts among its religious
leaders and activists the following: Richard Land, Southern Baptist Convention; Eboo Patel, In-
terfaith Youth Core; Feisal Abdul Rauf, Cordoba Initiative; David Saperstein, Religious Action
Center of Reform Judaism; Chris Seiple, Institute for Global Engagement; Richard Stearns,
World Vision; Jim Wallis, Sojourners; and Robert Wood, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints. For the full list see www.cfr.org/about/outreach/religioninitiative/advisory_board.
html
 www.aei.org/policy/society-and-culture/religion/
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issues with a focus on the religious character of America and Middle Eastern pol-
itics, in particular with reference to Israel and political Islam.
An important post-secular development in the secularized intellectual and
policy milieu of Washington DC was the creation of the well-funded Pew
Forum on Religion & Public Life in 2001.⁴⁵ The PEW Forum on Religion is one
of the largest of seven projects that make up the Pew Research Center, a non-par-
tisan research and polling institute. The Forum started as a place for bringing re-
ligious leaders across traditions – mainly Christians, Muslims and Jews – to en-
gage in dialogue and interfaith discussions in the tense post-9/11 atmosphere.
When Louis Lugo joined as director in 2004, he turned the forum into a research
center that, as the website states, seeks to “promote a deeper understanding of
issues at the intersection of religion and public affairs.” It does so through two
main programs, one on Religion and American Society, and the other on Religion
and World Affairs.
The following statement by Louis Lugo, explaining the rational for re-direct-
ing the PEW Forum towards a research center on religion, captures perfectly the
sentiment of many in the post-secular epistemic community:
When I took my Ph.D. in political science at the University of Chicago most social scientific
theories I was taught assumed the world to be secularizing. But already since the late 1970 s
with the Iranian revolution and Likud winning its first election in Israel I realized then that
some kind of religious resurgence was occurring in the world… Peter Berger’s admission
that he was wrong about secularization in the 1990 s was another turning point. Things
were happening, religion was everywhere, but no one was noticing.With the Forum we at-
tempted to fill that knowledge vacuum with solid social scientific research.⁴⁶
Seiple’s IGE and Johnston’s ICRD faith-based “think and do tanks” have become
important fulcrums of research and debates on religion in international affairs.
IGE’s Center on Faith and International Affairs hosts a thriving research program
that seeks to equip “scholars, practitioners, policymakers, and students with a
balanced understanding of the role of religion in public life worldwide.”⁴⁷ The
Center has been involved in supporting and publishing a series of scholarly
and policy-oriented books on the nexus between religion, security, and interna-
tional affairs,⁴⁸ featuring most recently and prominently a volume co-edited by
IGE’s Dennis Hoover and ICRD’s Douglas Johnston entitled Religion and Foreign
 www.pewforum.org/
 Louis Lugo,  June, , interview with author.
 www.globalengage.org/research/about.html
 http://globalengage.org/faith-international-affairs/books
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Affairs: Essential Readings.⁴⁹ Since 2002, IGE publishes a quarterly journal, The
Review of Faith & International Affairs, which is, to this day, the only peer-re-
viewed scholarly journal entirely dedicated to issues of religion and world poli-
tics.⁵⁰
2.2 Religion, conflict and peace
Research at the intersection of religion, violence and conflict-resolution has ex-
panded exponentially within the academic field, as well as in the think tank
community. A particularly prominent focus has been directed towards the
issue of “religious engagement.” Religious engagement is an umbrella term
that encompasses two key concerns about American foreign policy voiced by
post-secular intellectuals and experts: first, a critique of what is perceived to
be an excessively secular approach to international affairs, which is blind to re-
ligious dynamics and conflicts; second, a call to understand religion and to in-
clude religious actors and factors more constituently in American diplomacy and
conflict-resolution strategies.
Douglas Johnston and his ICRD have been at the forefront of these debates
since the 1990 s, and have continued to be throughout the 2000 s.⁵¹ A growing
range of scholars, policy analysts, and religious activists have joined Johnston
and his efforts to bring greater attention to religious engagement in American
foreign policy. ⁵²
 Dennis Hoover and Douglas Johnston, eds. Religion and Foreign Affairs: Essential Readings.
(Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, ).The book collects a wide-range of seminal articles and
excerpts in the field by Madeleine Albright, Scott Appleby, Benjamin Barber, Peter Berger, Timo-
thy Byrnes, José Casanova, Thomas Farr, Jonathan Fox, Jeffrey Haynes, Allen Hertzke, Samuel
Huntington, Mark Juergensmeyer, Paul Marshall, Vali Nasr, Daniel Philpott, Timothy Shah,
Chris Seiple, and Scott Thomas, among others.
 Since , The Review is being published by Routledge/Taylor & Francis, improving its
scholarly quality and credibility, along with making it more widely available through the pub-
lisher’s indexes.
 Douglas M. Johnston, ed. Faith-based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, ); Douglas M. Johnston, Religion, Terror, and Error: US Foreign Policy and the
Challenge of Spiritual Engagement (Santa Barbara, California: Praeger Publishers, ).
 The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) established a permanent Religion and Peacemak-
ing Program in . AT CSIS, religious-related initiatives are less well institutionalized. In
, CSIS Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project hosted a series of events on religion in conflict
settings and produced a groundbreaking -page report entitled Mixed Blessings: U.S. Govern-
ment Engagement with Religion in Conflict-Prone Settings (Washington D.C.: Center for Interna-
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Most prominent is the 2010 report on Engaging Religious Communities
Abroad: A New Imperative for U.S. Foreign Policy by the Chicago Council on Glob-
al Affairs, explicitly addressed to the Obama administration.⁵³ The report argued
that “despite a world abuzz with religious fervor […] the U.S. government has
been slow to respond effectively to situations where religion plays a global
role.”⁵⁴ It urged President Obama and his national security staff to make religion
and engaging with religious communities around the world “an integral part of
our [American] foreign policy.”⁵⁵
The document was the result of a task force of thirty-two “experts and stake-
holders” – former government officials, religious leaders, heads of international
organizations, and scholars. The task force was co-chaired by Scott Appleby and
Richard Cizik, president of the New Evangelical Partnership for the Common
Good and former Vice President for Governmental Affairs of the National Asso-
ciation of Evangelicals (NAE). Key scholars and policy analysts directly or indi-
rectly affiliated with Georgetown’s Berkley Center were included in the task
force, including José Casanova, Thomas F. Farr, Timothy Samuel Shah, Katherine
Marshall, and William Inboden. Douglas Johnston was also a member, along
with a number of prominent Muslim scholars and activists, such as Radwan
A. Masmoudi, Dalia Mogahed, and Eboo Patel.
It is within this intellectual context that a Religion and Foreign Policy Work-
ing Group was convened in the State Department as part of its wider Strategic
Dialogue with Civil Society initiative launched in 2011 to elevate and strengthen
the U.S. Government’s engagement with and support of a wide range of civil so-
ciety actors. The Religion and Foreign Policy working group was tasked with
making recommendations on four issues: Religion in Foreign Policy and Nation-
al Security, Religious Engagement and Conflict Prevention/Mitigation, Interna-
tional Religious Freedom: Advocacy to Combat Religious-Based Violence and
Human Rights Abuse, and Faith-Based Groups and Development and Humani-
tarian Assistance. Chris Seiple of IGE was invited to be one of the two civil-soci-
tional and Strategic Studies, ). The report extensively surveyed – with the intention to im-
prove – US government attention and approaches to religion abroad.
 Chicago Council, “Engaging Religious Communities Abroad: A New Imperative for U.S. For-
eign Policy,” in Report of the Task Force on Religion and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy (Chi-
cago: Chicago Council on Global Affairs, ). The report was covered by major media outlets
and further generated a lively and sometimes heated debate within the social scientific commun-
ity in the pages of The Immanent Frame. See blogs.ssrc.org/tif/category/religious-freedom
 Chicago Council, “Engaging Religious Communities Abroad: A New Imperative for U.S. For-
eign Policy,” .
 . Chicago Council, “Engaging Religious Communities Abroad: A New Imperative for U.S. For-
eign Policy,” 
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ety, non-governmental representatives of the working group. Following on the
working group’s recommendations in 2012,⁵⁶ Secretary of State John Kerry creat-
ed an Office of Faith-Based Community Initiatives in 2013.⁵⁷
2.3 International religious freedom
International religious freedom has become a major preoccupation of the Amer-
ican post-secular epistemic community. Research and advocacy efforts on this
issue have continued and expanded in the think tank community since 2001.
Nina Shea and Paul Marshall moved the Centre for Religious Freedom from Free-
dom House to the Hudson Institute in 2001.⁵⁸ Chris Seiple of IGE went on to co-
found the International Religious Freedom (IRF) Roundtable, a Washington-area
consortium of NGOs concerned with the issue of religious freedom. The roundta-
ble meets bi-monthly to discuss how best to promote religious freedom in Amer-
ican foreign policy,Washington policy circles, and across countries worldwide.⁵⁹
These efforts are joined by greater scholarly attention to the historical roots,
normative and philosophical substance, as well as strategic security imperatives
of religious freedom as foundational to promoting democratic practices, fighting
religious fundamentalism, fostering peace, and supporting economic develop-
ment in societies around the world. Leading this scholarly effort has been Tho-
mas Farr at Georgetown’s Berkley Center, who has written about religious free-
dom on leading policy-oriented journals, such as Foreign Affairs and Foreign
Policy.⁶⁰ Since 2011, Farr also directs, along with Timothy Samuel Shah, the Berk-
ley Center’s Religious Freedom Project. The Project counts among its associates
scholars and prominent academics on religion in the social sciences, including
José Casanova, William Inboden, Daniel Philpott, and Monica Duffy Toft.⁶¹
An important source of social scientific research on religious freedom are the
reports on Global Restrictions of Religion compiled by Brian Grimm at the PEW
 IGE, “Inaugural Meeting of State Department Working Group on Religion and Foreign Poli-
cy,” Institute for Global Engagement (IGE), http://www.globalengage.org/pressroom/releases/
-video-now-available-from-the-working-group-on-religion-and-foreign-policy.html.
 http://www.state.gov/s/fbci/#
 http://crf.hudson.org/
 www.aicongress.org/wp-content/uploads///IRF-Roundtable-Web-Update.pdf.
 Thomas F. Farr, “Diplomacy in an Age of Faith: Religious Freedom and National Security,”
Foreign Affairs , no.  (); Thomas F. Farr, “Undefender of the Faith,” http://www.for
eignpolicy.com/articles////undefender_of_the_faith.
 See: berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/rfp
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Forum on Religion.⁶² The PEW reports have provided a vast array of empirical
data and statistics that scholars, campaigners and interested policymakers
have widely and regularly drawn upon in their research and advocacy efforts.
Grimm has explored the relationship between religious freedom and violence
in further scholarly publications with leading sociologists of religion,⁶³ and re-
cently founded the Religious Freedom and Business Foundation.⁶⁴
Parts of the post-secular epistemic community concerned with religious free-
dom are closely affiliated with the implementation, consolidation and expansion
of America’s international religious freedom policy. Robert Seiple served as first-
ever U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom in the State
Department (between 1998 to 2000). Thomas Farr served as first director of the
State Department’s Office of International Religious Freedom (1999–
2003). Nina Shea served as Commissioner of the United States Commission on
International Religious Freedom (mandated by the 1998 International Religious
Freedom Act). Moreover, Farr, Shea, Paul Marshall, Timothy Samuel Shah, Chris
Seiple, and Brian Grimm have all, in various occasions and capacities, testified
before Congress on issues of international religious persecution and freedom in
the past two decades.
In terms of foreign policy priorities and bureaucratic politics, while slowly
gaining ground, religious freedom remains largely quarantined and marginal-
ized within the State Department.⁶⁵ Paradoxically, post-secular experts usually
critical of this agenda, mostly associated with the Politics of Religious Freedom
project based at the University of California, Berkeley and Northwestern Univer-
sity, are contributing to raising the issue’s domestic and international profile.⁶⁶
The power of American international religious freedom discourse and practices,
these critiques suggest, can no longer be ignored and its problematic nature
needs to be urgently addressed. This is a further way that the heterogeneous, plu-
ralist, and internally divided American post-secular epistemic community on re-
ligion in international affairs contributes to put religion on the scholarly and pol-
icy agenda.
 http://www.pewforum.org/category/publications/restrictions-on-religion/
 Brian J. Grim and Roger Finke, The Price of Freedom Denied: Religious Persecution and Con-
flict in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ).
 http://religiousfreedomandbusiness.org/
 GAO, “International Religious Freedom Act: State Department and Commission Are Imple-
menting Responsibilities but Need to Improve Interaction,” (Washington D.C.: United States Gov-
ernment Accountability Office (GAO), ).
 http://politics-of-religious-freedom.berkeley.edu/
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3 Conclusion
With the end of the Cold War, a noticeable but sporadic interest emerged among
American scholarly and policy elites toward exploring the ways that religion ap-
peared to “matter” in international affairs and, by fiat, also to American foreign
policy. Critiques of the secularization theory – its role in the production of social
scientific knowledge about international affairs, as well as its influence over how
the foreign policy establishment approached the world – were being put forward
at this time.
The events of 9/11 provided a second turning point in this process. From then
on, both a qualitative and quantitative explosion of post-secular expertise occur-
red in terms of new centers, initiatives, programs, and courses within the secular
and religious academic and policy research worlds. Much of it sought to explore
or critique the complex and multiple facets at the nexus of religion and interna-
tional affairs. Their central claim was that social scientists on the one hand, and
American foreign policy makers on the other, should better understand and in-
tegrate religion as defined according to the pluralist views of this epistemic com-
munity. As a result, over the past twenty years, the Washington foreign policy
establishment’s institutional and intellectual milieu has undergone what can
be conceptualized as a process of desecularization.⁶⁷ Talking about religion is
no longer taboo among intellectual and policy elites.
Some tentative links between the rise of this heterogeneous post-secular
epistemic community on international affairs and specific changes in American
foreign policy were provided. In particular, it appears that post-secular expertise
has been tied to the creation of a Faith Based and Community Initiatives office in
the State Department, as well as to the institutionalization, consolidation and ex-
pansion of international religious freedom policy. Much closer scrutiny of the
causal relationship between the emergence of the post-secular epistemic com-
munity, with its contestation of secular knowledge and practices, and changes
in American foreign policy is warranted. The opposite should also be investigat-
ed – to what extent has the desire to influence American foreign policy driven
much scholarly research on religion in international affairs?
 Vyacheslav Karpov, “Desecularization: A Conceptual Framework,” Journal of Church and
State . ().
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